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INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS
BY RESORT TO THE RECORD
L. HAROLD LEVINSON*
The convening of the 1977-78 Florida Constitution Revision Com-
mission was an event of national significance. The commission was
the result of a provision in the 1968 Florida Constitution' without
equivalent in any other state.' The appointment of a revision com-
mission is required at regular intervals, starting in 19773 and recur-
ring each twentieth year following, for the purpose of examining the
entire state constitution and proposing any desired changes to the
people at a statewide referendum.
The 1977-78 commission has become noteworthy, not only be-
cause of its very existence, but also because of the great amount of
time and expense that have been devoted to the preparation and
preservation of the record of the commission's proceedings. Al-
though the commission is unique with regard to its activation at
regular intervals with an unlimited agenda to propose constitutional
changes, the operations of the commission are similar to those of
state legislatures and constitutional conventions when such bodies
serve as "framers" of proposed constitutional changes. The poten-
tial value of the record of the 1977-78 Florida Constitution Revision
Commission may be seen in the tradition of Florida and other states
which have used the record of the deliberations of the framers as an
aid to interpreting constitutional changes.4
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.B.A. 1957, LL.B. 1962, University of Miami;
LL.M. 1964, New York University; J.S.D. 1974, Columbia University.
The author gratefully acknowledges research assistance provided by Leslie J. Canfield,
J.D., Vanderbilt University, while she was a law student.
1. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
2. A. STURM, TRENDS IN STATE CONSTITUTION-MAKING: 1966-1972, at 28 (1973); Sturm, The
Procedure of State Constitutional Change-with Special Emphasis on the South and Florida,
5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 569 (1977).
3. The constitution includes conflicting provisions on the date of the first commission to
be appointed following adoption of the 1968 constitution. The 1977 date was decided on by
the Supreme Court of Florida. In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor Request of Nov. 19,
1976 (Constitution Revision Commission), 343 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1977).
4. The major Florida sources are: In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor Request of Nov.
19, 1976 (Constitution Revision Commission), 343 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1977); In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor, 276 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1973); City of St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild &
Associates, 239 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970); Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1970); Hayek
v. Lee County, 231 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1970); 1978 FLA. Op. ATr'Y GEN. 078-34; 1977 FLA. Op.
Arr'y GEN. 077-65; 6 FLA. JuR. Constitutional Law § 13 (1956).
Recent out-of-Florida cases include: Way v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. 3d
Ct. App. 1977); Buckley v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 355 N.E.2d 806 (Mass. 1976);
Keller v. Smith, 553 P.2d 1002 (Mont. 1976); Helms v. Reid, 394 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct.
1977); Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1976).
568 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:567
Scholarly interest has focused, understandably, on the courts as
the most authoritative sources of constitutional interpretation.
Mention, however, should also be made of nonjudicial interpreters
of constitutional language, including executive and administrative
officials, legislators, lobbyists, lawyers, and numerous private citi-
zens. These nonjudicial interpreters make decisions, virtually on a
daily basis, about the meaning of their constitutions, subject to
relatively infrequent scrutiny by the courts. The techniques and
sources of constitutional interpretation are therefore of concern to
the nonjudicial as well as the judicial interpreters.
This article deals with the interpretation of state constitutions,
not the United States Constitution. Significant differences should
be noted. First, the Federal Constitution was adopted through rati-
fication by state legislatures, and the intentions of those legislatures
are to a considerable extent preserved by the journals of legislative
proceedings-intentions that often conflict from one state to an-
other. State constitutions, on the other hand, are adopted by a
direct vote of the people, and the people's intent may be virtually
impossible to ascertain, except from circumstantial evidence.
Second, the Federal Constitution is relatively difficult to amend,
and this may justify considerable flexibility in the interpretation of
the constitutional text. State constitutions are easier to amend and
may therefore provide less justification for flexible interpretation. A
third and related distinction is that the Federal Constitution was,
for the most part, written two centuries ago. Needs have changed,
the meaning of certain words in our language has changed, and
relatively flexible interpretation may be required. In contrast, many
state constitutions are the products of our own times, speaking in
our language about our current problems. Less flexibility seems
required in interpreting such documents.
Commentators on the interpretation of the Federal Constitution
are sharply divided regarding the extent to which the original intent
should be taken into account. 5 However, the cases and literature on
Secondary sources include: T. COOLEY, I CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 142-44 (8th ed.
1927); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 5 (1931); 16 AM.JuR.2D Constitutional Law § 88 (1964); Lousin,
Constitutional Intent: The Illinois Supreme Court's Use of the Record in Interpreting the
1970 Constitution, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 189 (1975); Sloan, Lessons in Constitutional
Interpretation: Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania, 82 DIcK. L. REv. 209 (1978).
5. For a selection of commentaries, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 363-72
(1977); Antieau, Constitutional Construction: A Guide To The Principles And Their
Application, 51 Nore DAME LAw. 358 (1976); Dewey, James Madison Helps Clio Interpret
the Constitution, 15 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 38 (1971); Miller, An Inquiry into the Relevance of
the Intentions of the Founding Fathers, With Special Emphasis Upon the Doctrine of Separa-
tion of Powers, 27 ARK. L. REV. 583 (1973); Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean
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state constitutional interpretation seem to reflect a strong consensus
that original intent must be ascertained and respected.' The ulti-
mate success in this endeavor would be achieved if the original
intent of the people who adopted the constitutional provision could
be ascertained. If the language of the constitutional text is clear on
its face, this plain language is deemed to have been understood by
the people, and their intent is deemed to coincide with that plain
meaning. If, however, the constitutional text does not yield a plain
meaning, resort may be had to other sources in order to find the
original intent of the people.
On occasion, the people's intent is sought in such materials as
newspaper commentaries or summaries appearing on the ballot.,
More frequently, the intent of the people is sought by examining the
intent of the framers A number of theories could be suggested in
favor of this technique. Perhaps the people conveyed their concerns
and instructions to the framers, who acted as agents of the people
in formulating the proposals for submission back to the people. Or
perhaps the framers, having completed their drafting process, re-
ported back to the people, explaining the meaning of the provisions
by informal methods of communication, leaving no historical record
but nevertheless imparting some level of understanding, so that the
people may have understood what the framers were proposing.
Another possible explanation is that the framers shared with the
people a general understanding of how language was used, and what
types of problems caused concern, so that the intent of the framers
would be likely to coincide with the intent of the people, even with-
out any direct communication flowing about specific provisions con-
tained in the proposals. Still another possible explanation for using
the intent of the framers to reflect the intent of the people is that
the people, in adopting the constitutional language, realized that
some of it could be fully understood only by the individuals who had
participated in the drafting process. It could be that the people did
not demand an explanation at the time of ratification but rather
What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. Rav. 1029 (1977); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The
Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. Rav. 502 (1964).
6. See sources cited note 4 supra, which all include strong deference to original intent.
7. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 243 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1971).
8. 1978 FLA. OP. Arr'v GEN. 078-34.
9. The sources cited in note 4 supra support the use of the intent of the framers as an
indication of the intent of the people. For a contrary view, see, e.g., Alexander v. People ex
rel. Schofield, 2 P. 894 (Colo. 1884), in which the court stated that the proceedings of a
constitutional convention are of no assistance in interpreting the language of a constitution
which has been adopted by the people.
1978]
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committed an act of faith, placing their trust in the undisclosed
intent of the framers.
A variation of this theory may be applied where the people are
called upon to cast a single vote for or against a document that
contains a large number of proposed constitutional provisions. Var-
ious individual electors may have sufficient interest to probe the
framers' intent underlying some of the provisions that are of special
concern, but few electors are likely to take the trouble to acquaint
themselves with the framers' intent regarding all provisions, even if
this intent could be found if requested. The result is that many
electors, in ratifying a package proposal, must have placed consider-
able trust in the intent of the framers.
A final explanation is that, if the intent of the people cannot be
found, the only feasible source of interpretation is the intent of the
framers, which is used in place of the intent of the people as the
most persuasive substitute available. The framers' intent provides
a demonstrable and fixed source of interpretation. It may serve as
a protection against some of the instability that could result from a
constitutional provision that is unclear on its face and is unaccom-
panied by any expression of original intent.
If the intent of the framers is to be examined as an aid to inter-
preting a constitutional provision that is not clear on its face, the
next task is to find the most acceptable indicator of the framers'
intent. In some states the framers prepare official explanations for
distribution to the people in advance of the ratification vote.1, In
most situations, however, the framers are unwilling or unable to
prepare an official explanation, and the best available source of
their intent is the record of their deliberative proceedings.
The intent of the framers is a useful aid in the interpretation of
constitutional provisions that are not clear on their face, but only if
the collective intent can be established. A vote by the deliberative
body during the drafting process may well be sufficient evidence of
collective intent. A speech by an individual member is not, by itself,
sufficient evidence, but it could be combined with other evidence
to help with the demonstration.
The search for collective intent therefore requires an examination
of the record as a whole and a compilation of all parts of the record
dealing with the specific point being examined. The record may not
contain enough evidence to lead to any conclusion at all; or the
record may contain such conflicting evidence that no collective in-
tent emerges; or the record may contain sufficient evidence tending
10. See PROPOSED CONSTTmON OF THE STATE OF TEXAs (1975); PROPOSED 1970 CONSTITU-
TION FOR THE STATE OF ILLNois (1970); WHAT THE PROPOSED NEW MICMGAN STATE CONsTrru-
TION MEANS TO You (1962).
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toward a single meaning so that it can be regarded as an acceptable
indicator of the collective intent of the framers.
A litigant who urges a certain interpretation of constitutional
language, based on his perception of the intent of the framers,
should bear the burden of searching the entire record of the framers'
proceedings and of demonstrating that the interpretation being
urged is supported by the entire record. The court, with the aid of
opposing counsel, should then conduct an independent search of the
entire record, in order to verify that the proponent's interpretation
is indeed supported by the record.
The process of searching the entire record is greatly facilitated if
the record has been suitably compiled, indexed, and made available
for public inspection. Preparation of an index by a reliable indexer
can permit the parties and the court to focus their attention on those
portions of the record that are identified, by the index, as relating
to the question at bar. If the compiled record and the index are
available to the public before the people's vote, the credibility of the
record is enhanced, and a closer identity is established between the
intent of the framers, as evidenced by the record, and the intent of
the people.
This identity does not depend on any assumption that the average
citizen availed himself of the opportunity to peruse the record before
casting a vote in the referendum. Rather, the point is that the
media, political action groups, and others with special interests may
have probed portions of the record, making public comments on
selected issues. Moreover, it may be assumed that the compiled and
indexed record was offered as a completed product, subject to what-
ever test might be imposed in the public forum, before the referen-
dum.
In the light of the preceding discussion, the record of the 1977-78
Florida Constitution Revision Commission is remarkably well
suited for use in interpreting any of the commission's proposals that
are approved at the November, 1978, referendum and that are not
clear on their face. The record has been carefully compiled by the
commission's staff and consultants to include background research
and memoranda of law prepared by the commission staff, summa-
ries of the public hearing testimony, committee minutes and re-
ports, proposals to amend or revise the constitution, transcripts of
every meeting of the full commission, journals of the commission
proceedings, correspondence, newsclippings, and, of course, such
standard items as calendars, amendments, and the vote on all ac-
tions considered by the commission."
i. The author visited the office of the Florida Constitution Revision Commission in
19781
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The record does not include transcripts of the debates of the com-
mittees, a loss that is partially offset by the inclusion of the commit-
tee minutes and the transcripts of the debates of the commission on
all matters. The record is divided into six sections each numbered
consecutively: reference files, public hearing testimony, committee
records, commission records, general administrative files, and news-
paper clippings. An index has been prepared, by subject matter, by
proposals and amendments, and by commissioners. Other finding
aids, such as tracing tables, transfer charts, and a bibliography of
resource material are also available. The original record and the
hard-copy index have been lodged in the state archives as public
documents. Microfiche copies of this record will hopefully be avail-
able for sale at the cost of copying before the November, 1978 refer-
endum.
It will therefore be quite feasible to rely on the index, and to
search all parts of the record identified by the index, on a specific
topic to find the interpretation, if any, that is supported by the
record as a whole. If the intent of the framers becomes apparent
from the search, this intent may be regarded with some confidence
as the intent of the people. This conclusion is especially plausible
in that suggestions were solicited from the public, many people
addressed the commission in response to these solicitations, the
responses are preserved in the commission's record, and these re-
sponses were the basis of many of the commission's proposals to
revise the constitution." This argument will be strengthened if the
record becomes available to the people before the referendum.
The record, however, will not solve all questions arising from the
need to interpret any constitutional amendments that may be
adopted in 1978. As noted above, the record may be inconclusive on
some items among the constitutional proposals. The commission
has, moreover, used some undefinable terms in its proposals, such
as "reasonable notice, ''3 "overriding governmental purposes,'" 4 and
"privacy interests."' 5 The author has not had an opportunity to use
the index and search the record for indications of the meaning in-
tended by the framers when these words were drafted. If the record
fails to disclose any significant clarification, one could assume that
the commission was content to permit the courts-and, subject to
March, 1978, and examined the record, which at that time was necessarily incomplete.
Subsequent developments in the compilation and indexing of the record have been described
to the author by editors of this Review.
12. Uhlfelder, The Machinery of Revision, infra this issue.
13. Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. 11, § 19(b) (May 11, 1978).
14. Id. art. I, §§ 24-25; id. art. V, §§ 1, 11(c).
15. Id.
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judicial review, other organs of government-to develop the mean-
ings of these terms as social needs arise, deriving some background
from past judicial and governmental practice, but not necessarily
limited by these traditions. If the people approve constitutional
proposals containing such language, without adequate clarification
in the record, the people may be deemed to have expressed their
faith in the framers' faith that the courts and other governmental
organs will apply these terms with sound judgment as future needs
arise.
Finally, it could be argued that the record of the 1977-78 Constitu-
tion Revision Commission may be used as an indicator of the mean-
ing of those portions of the Florida Constitution that the commis-
sion decided not to change. This argument would note that the
commission had an unlimited agenda to examine the entire consti-
tution and to propose changes in all or any part of it, and the
commission did indeed examine the entire document.
The commission will submit its proposals to the electors in eight
ballot items-each accompanied by a short descriptive explanation
of the change." The actual text of the constitution, showing pro-
posed deletions from the existing constitution in struck-through
type with proposed additions in underlined type, will be published
in newspapers throughout the state in the tenth and the sixth weeks
preceding the election. 7 Thus, it could be asserted that the commis-
sion has proposed, in effect, the readoption of those portions of the
existing constitution that remain unchanged in the ballot packages.
This is especially true for the "omnibus provision," ballot item
number one, which includes every change which has not been se-
vered from the basic document for a separate vote." The people, if
they vote favorably on any of the ballot choices, will thereby readopt
those portions of the existing constitution included within that
16. The existing constitution requires the commission to file its proposal, if any, for a
revision of the constitution. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(c). Case law has recognized that a
"revision" is a major change, by contrast to an "amendment," which makes relatively minor
changes. Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1970). The commission proposal is drafted
in the format of a series of revisions. 33 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 586-90 (May 5, 1978). If all are
adopted at the November, 1978, referendum, these eight revisions will be the new Florida
Constitution, entirely replacing the existing constitution. Portions of the proposals are worded
identically to the corresponding provisions of the existing constitution.
17. FLA. CONSr. art. XI, § 5(b). The publication of a voter pamphlet was approved by the
1978 Florida Legislature (HB 720). The Governor, however, vetoed the bill because provisions
requiring a brief statement explaining the 1roposal in layman's terms, as well as arguments
in favor and in opposition, were deleted from the final version. The pamphlet would have cost
$750,000 for distribution, and the Governor questioned the expenditure. Letter from R. Askew
to B. Smathers, Sec'y of State (June 23, 1978) (veto message).
18. 33 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 586 (May 5, 1978).
1978]
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package, together with the changes proposed by the commission.
Therefore, any materials in the commission records tending to ex-
plain the commission's understanding of those portions of the exist-
ing constitution which the commissioners did not seek to change
may be an acceptable indicator of the 1978 meaning of pre-1978
constitutional language.
This argument must be considered in the light of the traditional
rule of interpretation that when the framers repeat the language of
an old constitution in a new one, they are deemed to have been
familiar with the established meaning of the old constitution, as
construed in case law, and to have intended to preserve that estab-
lished meaning."9 The corollary is that if the framers wish to change
the meaning, their only method of doing so is to propose a change
in the language. If this traditional interpretation is followed, neither
the framers nor the people themselves have the capacity to change
the meaning of the existing constitution, unless they change the
language of the document itself. This rule could have harsh conse-
quences in a state where the process of constitutional change is
difficult. It appears less harsh in Florida, where constitutional
change can be proposed either through initiative, by the legislature,
by the calling of a convention, or by the Constitution Revision Com-
mission. 2
The traditional rule, however, could be viewed as merely a pre-
sumption that the old meaning should be retained, subject to rebut-
tal upon a demonstration that the framers-and perhaps the peo-
ple-had formulated an intent that the old language should be pre-
served, but with a new meaning. Not having searched the record,
the author is unaware whether any portions of the record express the
commissioners' collective intent to reinterpret the existing language
of the constitution without changing the constitutional text, in a
sufficiently persuasive manner to rebut the presumption-if rebut-
tal is allowed-that the old meaning is locked into the old language.
In summary, the record of the proceedings of the framers-such
as the Florida Constitution Revision Commission-may be of con-
siderable help in interpreting constitutional changes and arguably
could aid in construing parts of the constitution left unchanged by
the framers. The record is significant for such purposes, however,
only if a particular interpretation is supported by the collective
intent of the framers as revealed by the record as a whole.
19. Hayek v. Lee County, 231 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1970).
20. FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1 (proposal by legislature), 3 (initiative), 4 (convention).
